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Olivier: UNIDROIT Convention

COMMENT

THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION:
ATTEMPTING TO REGULATE THE
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRAFFIC OF
CULTURAL PROPERTY

I. INTRODUCTION

International art theft and illegal trafficking of cultural
propertyl has reached epidemic proportions. 2 In value transferred, the illicit art trade ranks second only to narcotics trafficking.3 Art theft is rampant in many countries that are rich
in art and archaeological resources, and stolen pieces are
rarely recovered. 4 Furthermore, current statistics do not reflect the countless archeological artifacts which are secretly

1. For the purposes of this article, "cultural property" refers to works of art
that are considered an integral part of a country's cultural heritage, history or
ethnicity.
2. Over $2 billion worth of art stolen each year. John Larrabee, Price Is
Placed On The Priceless, USA TODAY, March 17, 1995 at 4A [hereinafter
Larrabee]. The rate of theft increases 10% each year. Frances Gibb, High Art And
Low Cunning, THE TIMES, July 4, 1995 (Features) [hereinafter Gibb).
3. Nina R. Lenzner, The Illicit International Trade in Cultural Property: Does
the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Remedy for the Shortcomings of the
UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 469, 473 (1994) [hereinafter
Lenzner].
4. William D. Montalbano, Big Business Art Thieves Find Italy Is a Gold
Mine, Los ANGELES TIMES, August 25, 1988, at 16 [hereinafter Montalbano]. For
example, in Italy, thieves rob churches, museums and private collections of their
art objects at a rate of more than one per hour. Id. Worldwide, the recovery rate
of stolen art ranges between ten and fifteen percent. John Rockwell, Rome Has a
Show of Stolen Artworks to Highlight a Fight, THE NEW YORK TIMES, May 25,
1994, at C13, C19 [hereinafter Rockwell] In Italy, of the 29,000 works of art stolen in 1993, only 5,500 were recovered. Id.
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excavated and illegally exported every year. 5 Intensifying the
problem are conflicting laws among nations regarding property
rights and the export of cultural property which often facilitate
art theft and illicit trade of cultural objects. 6 The recent removal of internal borders within the newly formed European
Union has made illegal export of cultural property even easier. 7 Consequently, the member states of the European Union
have sought increased protection of their cultural property. 8
This Comment will begin by providing a background of the
various types of art theft and the steps, including the
UNESCO Convention, the US Cultural Property Implementation Act and the EC Directive and Regulation, that European
countries and the United States have taken to curb the illicit
trade in works of art. 9 This Comment will then examine the
recently enacted UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural ObjectslO (hereinafter "UNIDROIT Conven-

5. John H. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, 4 INT'L
J. CULTURAL PRoP. No.1, 13, 34 n.100 (1995) [hereinafter Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects].
6. Victoria Vitrano, Protecting Cultural Objects in an Internal Border-Free EC:
The EC Directive and Regulation for the Protection and Return of Cultural Objects,
17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1164, 1169 (1994) [hereinafter Vitrano].
7. Id. at 1165. The removal of internal borders within the European Union
results in the elimination of customs posts and border checks. Id. Thieves can
easily tranaport stolen objects from one European country to another. Richard
Mangnall, UK' Special Report - Fine Art and Specie -Highlighting Causes of Theft
Can Aid Prevention, LWYD'S LIST, REUTER TExTLINE, April 10, 1993, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File [hereinafter Mangnall].
8. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1164. According to Jean-Michel Mimerand, director of the Office for Repression of Art Thefts, in Paris, "France and Italy, closely
followed by Spain, are the most pillaged countries. The criminal networks are well
organized to get the merchandise out to transit countries very quickly." William
Tuohy, Art Thievery Is Thriving, L.A. TIMES, August 16, 1994, (World Report) at 4
[hereinafter Tuohy].
The fifteen member states of the European Union presently include Belgium,
Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. Treaty on
European Union or Maastricht Treaty, 31 I.L.M. 297 (1992) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
9. See infra notes 54-195, examining the types of export laws and international accords the member States of the European Union and the United States have
implemented to deter the theft and illegal export of art and cultural property.
10. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT)
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 23, 1995 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]. See Appendix for the text of the UNIDROIT Convention.
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tion") and discuss why art importing nations oppose it. This
Comment will conclude that because the final draft of the
UNIDROIT Convention contains many provisions that the
museum community and commercial art world find unacceptable, the Convention risks losing art importing nations as
signatories. l l Consequently, the UNIDROIT Convention may
be just as ineffective as previous legislation in providing legal
remedies to prevent the theft of, and facilitate the return of,
stolen cultural property.
II. BACKGROUND
The sky-rocketing value of art has made international art
theft and trade especially attractive to thieves. 12 Art theft has
increased rapidly throughout the world because the objects are
extremely valuable, easily hidden and transported, and the
legal owne'r of the work is difficult to identify. IS Generally, art
theft is divided into two categories, private theft and illegal
export. 14 In order to curb both private theft within a country
and the illegal export of art, numerous countries, including
many European nations and the United States, have enacted
laws regulating art trade within their own borders. 15 In addi-

11. See infra notes 199-263 and accompanying text.
12. Julian Radcliffe, UK: Art Loss Register to Help Combat Increase in Fine
Art Theft, REUTER TExTLINE, REVIEW, April 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, World Library, Txtnws File [hereinafter Radcliffe]. Since World War II, a rising interest in
antiquities has caused a dramatic increase in their monetary value. Paul M. Bator,
An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REv. 275, 291 (1982)
[hereinafter Bator]. Exorbitant prices have provoked a world-wide search for antique objects and have fueled the black market. Id. Paintings are bringing in prices never seen before. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 475 n.25. Van Gogh's Irises sold
for $53.9 million in 1987; Van Gogh's "Portrait of Dr. Cachet" which sold for $82.5
million in May, 1990, is the most expensive work ever sold in an auction. Id.
13. Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts and Antiquities, 36
How. L.J. 17, 20-21 (1993) [hereinafter Collin]. Even if an art thief is caught, the
police must prove where the art objects came from. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 4.
According to Scotland Yard's Detective Inspector Jill McTigue, "Our biggest problem is finding where the artistic loot is stolen from." Id.
14. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 471. Lenzner explains that art theft exists in
two distinct forms: the theft of works of art from their owners and the illegal
export of art. Id.
See infra notes 19-53 and accompanying text discussing private art theft
and the illegal export of cultural property.
15. See infra notes 54-92 and accompanying text discussing various national
laws restricting the export of cultural property.
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tion, governments have combined efforts to reduce the illicit
trade of cultural property by signing international agreements
and accords. 16
A. Two FORMS OF ART THEFT: PRIVATE THEFT AND ILLEGAL
EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

Art theft occurs in two distinct ways.17 First, private theft
occurs when art thieves steal directly from the owners of art,
including private collections, museums, galleries, and the
State. 18 Second, the illegal export of art occurs when the cultural property of nations that regulate the movement of these
types of objects is transported outside those national borders.19
1. Private Art Theft

Private theft occurs when thieves rob collections, museums
and institutions, whether public or private, of their art and
archaeological objects. 20 In Italy and much of Western Europe,
churches are the prime targets of art thieves. 21 In the United
States, galleries and private collections are the most common
targets of art theft.22 Although criminals now prefer art theft

See infra notes 131-164 and accompanying text discussing the United States'
Cultural Property Implementation Act and United States court rulings defining
legislation on cultural property in this country.
16. See infra notes 93-130, discussing the UNESCO Convention of 1970, the
EC Directive and EC Regulation on the movement of cultural property.
See infra notes 93-263, discussing the UNIDROIT Convention passed in June,
1995.
17. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 471.
18. [d.
19. [d. at 472. megal export does not necessarily imply theft. [d. at 472 n.16.

Although countries with restrictive export laws claim illegally exported objects are
"stolen," the United States has traditionally rejected this view. [d.
20. [d. at 471.
21. Daniel Golden, HOT ART; With Picassos Going for $38 Million, Art Theft
Has Become a Booming Billion·Dollar Illegal Business, Second Only to Narcotics,
BOSTON GLOBE, February 12, 1989, (Magazine), at 16, 24 [hereinafter Golden].
22. [d. In March 1990, thieves stole $200 million in paintings from the
Isabella Steward Gardner Museum in Boston, in the most expensive art theft in
history. Radcliffe, supra note 12. The thieves entered the museum disguised as
policemen, bound and gagged the guards, removed the film from surveillance cameras and disarmed the alarms. [d. They made off with one Vermeer, one Manet
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over bank robbery, museums cannot afford to install the most
sophisticated security systems. 23 Additionally, private collections are rarely better equipped to protect themselves from
thieves. 24
Large and small-scale thefts of valuable art works occur
continually. In 1990, masked men broke into a storeroom at
ancient Herculaneum near Pompeii and stole over 200 antiquities worth over $18 million.25 In 1991, armed robbers broke
into Amsterdam's Van Gogh Museum and escaped with twenty
Dutch Impressionist works.26 In 1994, thieves demanded $1
million ransom for Norway's most famous painting, Edvard
Munch's "The Scream", stolen from the National Gallery in
February of that year. 27 Usually, rare and famous art objects
are safer from theft than lesser known pieces because rare
objects draw too much attention to be sold discreetly.28 However, some wealthy art collectors will commission thieves to
steal famous works who then ship them to South America,
Switzerland or Japan. 29
and three Rembrandt paintings. [d. The thieves irreparably damaged the two
Rembrandts when they cut them from their frames. Id.
23. Mangnall, supra note 7.
24. Id. Criminals recognize art theft is a lucrative crime and are using violence at an increasing rate. Id. Professor Norman Palmer, Rowe & Maw Professor
of Commercial Law at University College London says that, "not only is art theft
more common, it is less discriminate, more violent, less scrupulous, better
organised and more closely tied to organised crime generally." Gibb, supra note 2,
at 33.
25. James Walsh, It's a Steal, TIME, November 25, 1991, (Art), at 86 [hereinafter Walsh].
26. Id. A flat tire on the thieves' getaway car allowed authorities to recover
the stolen paintings which exceeded $500 million in value. Id.
27. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 1. Luckily, police succeeded in finding the painting
before delivering the ransom. Id. In June, 1994, a thief managed to steal a 17th
century portrait from the Louvre, in Paris, between the rounds of the guards. Id.
Later, in July of 1994, thieves bound and gagged the guard at Frankfurt's Schiro
Kunsthalle after the gallery closed, then took three paintings insured for $45 million. Id. The paintings stolen included two oil paintings by English Romantic
painter J.M.W. Turner and a landscape painting by the German Master Caspar
David Friedrich. Id. The Turner paintings were on loan from the Tate Gallery in
London, and the Friedrich was on loan from a museum in Hamburg. Tuohy, supra
note 8, at 1.
28. Golden, supra note 21, at 24. "Fame is a kind of reverse insurance policy.
Sometimes when thieves realize they have stolen a piece so well known that it is
impossible to sell, police receive an anonymous call saying where it is abandoned."
Montalbano, supra note 4, at 3.
29. Radcliffe, supra note 12. These countries have laws that are conducive to
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Sophisticated crime rings have made private art theft even
more pervasive and complex. 30 For example, art theft is often
linked with the sale of drugs, narcotics dealers accept paintings as partial payment in drug transactions and then sell
them at auctions to receive "clean money.,,31 Furthennore,
drug money can be laundered by purchasing high priced art at
auctions, which can later be used as collateral or resold. 32
Moreover, highly sophisticated art thieves commit insurance
fraud by holding an object for ransom. Increasingly, thieves
negotiate with insurers to pay them an amount that is lower
than the amount due under the legal owner's policy.33

art theft. For example, in Switzerland, once one obtains a stolen painting he or
she can lock it in a Swiss bank vault, and after five years, the object becomes
their property as long as he or she is not the thief. Id. In Japan, there is only a
two-year statute of limitations on stolen goods. Peter Plagens, To Catch a Thief,
NEWSWEEK, April 2, 1990, (Arts), at 52.
30. See Britain Wants International Art Theft Squad, REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, May 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. See Mark
Palmer, Focus on Art Theft: Antiques Rogue Show Mark Palmer Goes on the Trail
of a New Generation of Artful Dodgers - the Gangs Who Have discovered a Fast
Road to Riches With the Easy Pickings of the Creme de la Creme, THE SUNDAY
TELEGRAPH, September 29, 1991, at 10 [hereinafter Palmer]. According to Mr.
Philip Saunders, managing director of TRACE, a monthly magazine which publishes
details regarding stolen art: "[art theft] is now so interlinked with serious crime,
particularly the narcotics trade and the laundering of dirty money, that even if
the police do not wish to look at it in its own right they must deal with it because of its associations." Id.
31. Palmer, supra note 30, at 10. Detective Richard Ellis of the Art and Antiques Squad at London's Scotland Yard explains how the art market is used to
launder drug money: "If you have a bundle of money which has been acquired
through a drug sale, you can go to an auction, buy in cash and then use it as
collateral. You can recoup the money later on with a receipt. Then you have clean
money." Kate Dourian, Traffic in Stolen Artwork Faces Attack; Insurance: Police in
Europe Fear That Theft Will Increase When Border Controls Are Dropped Next
Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1991, at A30 [hereinafter Dourian].
32. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30. British investigators believe that the Italian Mafia has used Italy's "single most valuable missing artwork," Caravaggio's
1609 "Nativity," as security for drug deals for over 20 years. Walsh, supra note
25, at 87. The work was stolen from the Oratory of San Lorenzo in Palermo,
Sicily in 1969 and is worth approximately $50 million today. Id. U.S. authorities
suspect that Columbian drug lords also possess priceless works of stolen art. Id.
33. Kimberly A. Short, Preventing the Theft and Illegal Export of Art in a
Europe Without Borders, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 633, 639 (1993) [hereinafter
Short]. Insurance companies often pay 10% of an object's value or more to recover
stolen art. Larrabee, supra note 2, at 4A.
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2. Illegal Export of Cultural Property
The second form of art theft is the illegal export of cultural
property.34 This occurs when objects of cultural significance
are transported or smuggled from a country that seeks to retain them within its national borders. 35 The illegal export of
artifacts and art work that a government considers cultural
property differs from private art theft in that it is committed
by taking an object across that nation's borders, regardless of
whether the object is exported by its true owner or a thief.36
Illegal export is a crime against the State, because such
action is in direct violation of State law. 37 Until recently, the
majority of legislation regarding the return of cultural property
specified that only a government or a public institution could
bring a cause of action against the "good faith possessor',38 of
a stolen object.39 As a result, private art collectors had little
recourse to obtain the return of art stolen from their collections. 40

34. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 472.
35. 1d.
36. John H. Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, 111 UFITA: ARCHlY
FUR URHEBER-FILM-FuNK-UND THEATERRECT 63, 68 n.14 (1989) [hereinafter
Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controlsl. For example, a tourist has the legal
right to buy a work of art in a country such as Greece or Italy. 1d. However,
since the governments of these nations prohibits the removal of such objects, it is
illegal for the tourist to take the art when he or she leaves the country. 1d.
37. See generally, Lyndel V. Prott & Patrick J. O'Keefe, UNESCO, HANDBOOK
OF NATIONAL REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE EXPORT OF CULTURAL PROPERTY,
(1988) [hereinafter Prott & O'Keefel, citing the cultural export laws of over 180
countries.
38. A good faith purchaser is "one who buys without notice of circumstance
which would put a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry as to the title, or as to
an impediment on the title of a seller." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed.
1990).
39. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the
Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14,
1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (1972). [hereinafter UNESCO Conventionl. The UNESCO
Convention specifies that only works of art considered "cultural property" that
have been "stolen from a museum or a religious or secular public monument or
similar institution" are covered under the Convention. 1d. at art. 1.
40. 1d. at art. 1. The UNESCO Convention, the principal piece of legislation
regarding cultural property since its adoption in 1970, only provides the governments of signatory states the right to sue for the return of art stolen from "a
museum or a religious or secular public monument or similar institution." 1d.
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Traditionally, conquering powers would export a country's
art as a show of strength and domination. 41 For example, the
Louvre houses the treasures that Napoleon brought back from
his invasions of ltaly.42 On display at the British Museum are
the marble friezes that Lord Elgin removed from the Parthenon almost two centuries ago.43 Today, however, most art is
moved by an elaborate, international stolen art market, or
"black market," as evidenced by the stolen European art that is
frequently recovered abroad. 44
"Looting"45 is another significant source of the cultural
property illegally exported on the black market. 46 The illegal
excavation of artifacts and their eventual sale has occurred for
centuries. 47 The magnitude of the black market is greatly attributed to the restrictive national export laws which prevent
the existence of any legal market for artifacts.48 The looters49
who dig for artifacts now use modem technology such as metal
detectors and all-terrain vehicles to conduct nighttime excavations of archaeological sites in hopes of finding valuable treasures. 50 Local art dealers buy these archaeological finds and

41. Short, supra note 33, at 634.
42. Alexander Stille, Was This Statue Stolen?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988, at 32
[hereinafter Stille].
43.Id.
44. Bator, supra note 12, at 293-294.
45. "Looting" is the illegal excavation of ancient artifacts. It is a problem that
runs rampant in Mediterranean countries. Areas rich in archaeological objects left
by previous civilizations are being stripped clean by local residents who can make
a sizable profit by selling these treasures on the black market. See generally
Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16.
46. See Bator, supra note 12, at 301. Bator states that the escalating prices
paid for antiquities on the international art market stimulates the looting of archaeological sites. Id.
47. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 17. For example, the Etruscan tombs north
of Rome have been looted by such various groups including the ancient Romans,
soldiers of the Napoleonic era and 19th century tourists. Id.
48. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5,
at 20. See also Bator, supra note 12, at 318.
49. "Clandestini" is the Italian nickname for those art thieves who dig up
archaeological sites at night. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16. In the region
around Rome these looters are called "tombaroli." Id. In South America they are
known as "huaqueros." Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note
36, at 96.
50. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 17. The looting at the archaeological sites in
Sicily and north of Rome and Morgantina, is so severe the sites look as if they
have been shelled due to the number of freshly dug holes. Id. at 16.
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sell them outside the country, in violation of national export
laws. 51 Although no museum will buy an obviously stolen artifact, Swiss dealers can successfully "launder" newly found and
unrecorded objects by selling them to other dealers, collectors
and museums without an export certificate. 52 Tragically, looters often destroy the historic and scientific value of an archaeological site with their reckless digging. 53
B. EUROPEAN LAws REGARDING STOLEN ART AND CULTURAL
PROPERTY

Today, many European countries have laws regulating the
export of cultural property.54 Some countries allow the export
of cultural property upon review by a government committee,
while others simply prohibit it entirely. 55 Some countries,

51. Id. at 16.
52. Id. Swiss law does not require the proof of the origin of a piece of art, or
any export documents from the country it came from. Id. Once a piece is sold by
a dealer, it is considered legitimate. See Montalbano, supra note 4. Furthermore, a
stolen piece of art can be stored in a in Swiss bank vault for five years and come
out with clear legal title to the possessor. Radcliffe, supra note 12.
53. Thomas Maier, Nations Fight To Recover A Past They Say Was Plundered,
NEWSDAY, May 23, 1995, B29 [hereinafter Maier, Nations Fight To Recover A Past
They Say Was Plundered]. According to American archaeologist Martin McAllister,
"archaeological sites are now like endangered species . . . systematically targeted
and destroyed, and they can never be replaced. Once it's looted it's gone." Thomas
Maier, History as an Endangered Species, THE BALTIMORE SUN, May 29, 1995, p.
1D [hereinafter Maier, History as an Endangered Species]. While sites in Turkey,
Greece and Italy are suffering significant losses, American archaeological sites are
not immune from looting, either. Id. Sites such as the Revolutionary War battlefield in Saratoga, N.Y. and the ancient burial grounds of the Anasazi tribe in the
Southwest are also being plundered of their historic objects and scientific value.
Id.
54. Richard Mastalir, A Propos~l for Protecting the "Cultural" and "Property"
Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDliAM INT'L L.J.
1033, 1053 (1993) [hereinafter Mastalir]. Professors Merryman and Elsen categorized national export laws into four different types: (1) laws which totally prohibit
any exchange (Mexico and Guatemala); (2) laws which prohibit the export of designated objects of national importance (France and Italy); (3) laws which routinely
award export licenses (Great Britain and Canada); and (4) laws with no limitations on export (the United States). Id.
55. Bator, supra note 12, at 315. The countries that allow the export of cultural property based on government permission widely differ in their application of
this type of policy. Id. Many governments appear to have a presumption against
export and allow only unimportant items to leave the country. [d. England and
Japan, however, award export certificates for all objects of cultural property, except those which have special national importance. [d.
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such as Italy and Greece, have state ownership laws that claim
all "antiquities" as government property, including those pieces
not yet unearthed. 56 Other countries enact export laws that
require a governmental agency approve the export of cultural
property by granting an "export certificate."57 This government agency generally considers whether the object may be
sold, traded or loaned to anyone outside of the country. 58 The
agency then issues an export certificate to indicate governmental consent to the export of the object. 59 Consequently, a mere
showing that an object is illegally exported does not mean it is
stolen. 60 Even the lawful owner of a piece of cultural property
commits a crime by transporting the object outside national
borders if he or she does not have an export certificate. 61
Brazil, Bulgaria, People's Republic of China, Rus8ia and Zaire are countries
that prohibit the export of cultural property. Id. at 315 n.73. "Cultural property" is
typically defined to include virtually all noncontemporary art. Bator, supra note
12, at 315.
56. Montalbano, supra note 4, at 16. However, governments that claim ownership to all antiquities found in the ground are often not able to pay for objects
discovered, motivating people to sell their finds on the black market. Walsh, supra
note 28, at 88. Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Greece and Italy all claim state ownership
to artifacts found in their soil. Id. However, if someone does find an artifact in
those countries, the government will either confiscate their land to investigate
further or take the object in exchange for minimal or no compensation. Id. These
options encourage people to throw the objects away or sell them on the black
market at a fraction of the amount it will sell for later. Id.
If an Italian developer digs up an archaeological object at the site of a
building project, the object is automatically property of the Italian government
regardless of who owns the land. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, at 35. However, such discoveries are considered hazards
of business since they result in interminable delays while the government investigates the site and unforeseen expenses to accommodate the excavations. Id. Commonly, workmen are paid to keep quiet about the discovery and the antiquities
are covered up, destroyed or sold on the black market. Id.
57. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1175-76.
58. See generally Pratt & O'Keefe, supra note 37. For example, in France such
approval is given by the Minister of Cultural Affairs. Id. at 79. In Italy, the Minister of National Education issues export certificates for cultural property. Id. at
113. In the United Kingdom, if an Expert Adviser considers an object of "national
importance," the Reviewing Committee on the Export of Works of Art gives public
institutions a specified period of time to make a bid on the object. Id. at 225. If
no bid is made, the Reviewing Committee normally grants the export certificate.
Id.
59. See generally Pratt & O'Keefe, supra note 37.
60. Bator, supra note 12, at 286.
61. John H. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, 21 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. No.3, 477, 483 n.14 (1988) [hereinafter Merryman, The Retention of Cultural
Property J. A tourist is legally allowed to purchase a work of art in a source country, however national export restrictions may make it illegal to take the object
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The civil codes of Western European countries provide that
an original owner loses title to property stolen from him when
the thief sells it to a bona fide purchaser. 52 However, common
law jurisdictions like the United Kingdom and the United
States follow the rule that the original owner retains superior
title to his stolen property even if a third party innocently
purchases it.53 To determine choice of law in multi-national
matters, private international law observes the lex locus situs

when he or she leaves the country. Id. Legal problems also ensue when a rightful
owner decides to sell an object of cultural property. See Id. at n.15. For example,
a Frenchman sold his Nicholas Poussin painting to a dealer. The dealer took the
painting out of France without the requisite export certificate and sold it to the
Cleveland Museum. Id. The French government demanded the return of the painting and when the museum resisted, the French sent out a warrant for the arrest
of the museum's director. Id. After several years of dispute a compromis!l was
reached. Id. The Cleveland Museum retained recognized ownership of the painting,
while agreeing to lend it to the Louvre for a period of 25 years. Merryman, The
Retention of Cultural Property, at 483 n.15.
62. Collin, supra note 13, at 22. Article 1153 of the Italian Civil Code states:
"He to whom movable property . . . is conveyed by one who is not the owner
acquires ownership of it through possession, provided that he be in good faith at
the moment of consignment and there be an instrument or transaction capable of
transferring ownership . . . " Codice Civile C.C. art. 1153 (It.), cited in Vitrano,
supra note 6, at 1173 n.63.
The German Civil Code states:
(1) A person, who has a movable thing in his proprietary
possession for ten years acquires ownership (usucaption).
(2) Usucaption is excluded, if the acquirer is not in good
faith in obtaining possession or if he subsequently learns
that he is not entitled to ownership.
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch BGB art. 937 (Ger.), translated in The German Civil Code
(Fred B. Rothman 1975).
The French Civil Code also gives superior property rights to a good faith
possessor, except in two instances. Stephen Grover, The Need For Civil Law Nations to Adopt Discovery Rules in Art Replevin Actions: A Comparative Study, 70
TEx. L. REV. 1431, 1451 (1992) (explaining C. CIV. art. 2279-2280 (Fr.». First, the
original owner has a period of three years, from the time the chattel was stolen,
during which he or she may recover stolen goods from a subsequent purchaser. Id.
Second, Article 2280 provides a market overt exception, where if a good faith
purchaser buys stolen or lost goods "in a market, at a public sale, or from a dealer in this particular type of goods," the original owner can recover them from the
good faith purchaser in exchange for the purchase price paid. Id.
A "bona fide purchaser" is "one who has purchased property for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
177 (6th ed. 1990). The principle that a bona fide purchaser holds superior title to
the original owner is based upon Roman antecedents that sought to protect the
integrity of transactions in personal property in Europe after the devastating
plague had ended. Collin, supra note 13, at 22.
63. Collin, supra note 13, at 21. This principle is known as nemo dat quod
habet, meaning no one may give better title than he has. Id. at 21 n.28.
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rule,54 This rule dictates that the law of the country where a
transfer of personal property takes place governs the rights of
those who claim title to it,65 Art thieves often take advantage
of contrasting national laws and transfer stolen cultural property from common-law to civil-law countries where the original
title is extinguished when the item is sold,66
Governments apply export laws and restrictions in varying
degrees to control the kinds of objects allowed to leave the
country,67 Many countries enact broad definitions of cultural

64. [d. at 22.
65. [d.

66. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1167. According to Morris Collin:
It is not lost on sophisticated traffickers that the situs
rule, combined with bona fide purchaser laws in continental Europe, can prevail even against a rightful owner.
These traffickers possess the contacts and capital to
shoulder the costs of a transferring stolen art across borders in order to legitimate them. The lex locus situs rule
permits the manipulation of stolen art in such a way that
the goods will obtain market value, resulting in substantial profits.
Collin, supra note 13, at 24.
67. See generally Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37. For example, Egypt prohibits
the export of "antiquities." Law No. 117 of 1983, art. 1, cited in [d. at 70. Antiquities are defined as:
[alny movable or immovable property which is a product
of any of the various civilizations or any of the arts,
sciences, literatures and religions of the successive historical periods extending from prehistoric times to a point
one hundred years ago and that has archaeological or
historical value or significance as a relic of one of the
various civilizations established in Egypt or related to it.
It also includes human and animal remains from such
periods.
[d.
Greece restricts the export of movable or immovable antiquities. Act No.
5351 of 24 August 1932, art. 2, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 89.
These works include "architecture, sculpture, writings and any other works such as
buildings, monuments, vases, aqueducts, roads, walls, statues, idols, art, inlaid
mosaics, pottery, weapons, jewelry and any other works of whatever material including precious stones and coins. It includes articles from the time of Christianity
and from the Greek Middle Ages." [d.
France prohibits the export of "classified" objects, which includes any object,
whether movable or attached to immovable property, whose preservation is of
"national, historic, artistic, scientific or technical interest." Law of 31 December
1913, art. 21, 14, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 79. This also includes objects of national importance for historical or artistic reasons. Law of 32
June 1941, art. 1, cited in [d. This applies to "items of furniture made before
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property coupled with restrictive export laws to deter the theft
and illegal export of cultural property.68 However, these laws
often have an opposite effect and increase illegal trafficking by
creating a wider range of illegal trade. 69 Some authorities criticize this approach, claiming the objects are damaged by restrictive exportation laws. 70 For instance, many characterize a
country's effort to guard its cultural treasures as an excuse for
hoarding art.7l This "hoarding" results in huge amounts of art
left undocumented, unprotected and hidden from view.72 The
heavy restrictions on the flow of the legitimate art market
create an increased demand for objects considered cultural
property.73 As a consequence, these laws promote smuggling

1830, works of painters, engravers, draughtsmen, sculptors and decorators made
before 1900 and to objects resulting from excavations carried out in France or
Algeria." Id.
Italy considers objects of "artistic, historical, archaeological or ethnographical
interest" except works of living authors or works less than 50 years old, to be
objects of cultural property subject to export control. Law of 1 June 1939 XVI, No.
1089, art. 1, cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 113. No object of cultural
property is to be exported without an export license. Id. at art. 36.
Spain prohibits the export of cultural property without an export license.
This includes immovable and movable objects of artistic, palaeontological, archaeological, ethnographic, scientific or technical interest including the documentary and
bibliographical heritage. Law 13/1985 of 25 June 1985, arts. 1, 5, cited in Prott &
O'Keefe, supra note 37, at 197.
The United States restricts the export of "archaeological resources." These
are defined as any material remains of past human life or activities which are of
archaeological interest and includes pottery, basketry, bottles, weapons, weapon
projectiles, tools, structures or portions of structures, pit houses, rock paintings,
rock carvings, intaglios, graves, human skeletal materials or parts of any of these
items. All items must be at least 100 years old. Archaeological Resources Protection Act 1979, 16 U.S.C. § 470aa (Supp. 1982), cited in Prott & O'Keefe, supra
note 37, at 226.
68. See Mary McKenna, Problematic Provenance: Toward a Coherent United
States Policy on the International Trade in Cultural Property, 12 U. PA. J.INT'L
BuS. L. 83, 94 (1991).
69. Id. "The exponential increase in illegal trafficking in cultural property
reflects not just a surge in activity among art thieves and smugglers, but an expanded concept of 'illicit trade'." Id.
70. John H. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a
Common Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 757, 758-59 (1983) According to Professor Merryman, "the indiscriminate and insensitive use of export controls for this purpose may actually hinder rather than advance the interests that
their proponents rightly want to protect." Merryman, A Licit Trade in Cultural
Objects, supra note 5, at 25.
71. Merryman, A Licit Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5, at 19.
72. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Common Cultural Heritage, supra note 70, at 758.
73. Bator, supra note 12, at 318. According to Paul Bator, "the international
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and an active black market trade of cultural property to satisfy
that demand. 74
Each country has its own laws that specify which objects
constitute cultural property and, therefore, may not be exported. 75 "Art source" countries76 have an abundance of cultural
property and, therefore, more restrictive export policies. 77 In
general, these countries strongly oppose the export of cultural
objects,78 reasoning that their strict export laws protect the
physical safety of these objects and prevent the destruction of
the records of earlier civilizations. 79 An economic interest also
promotes restrictive export policies because famous pieces
promote tourism. 80 National pride and identity are often connected to a country's cultural treasures. 81 Furthermore, in
southern European countries, the government and the church,
the most prominent art patrons, favor keeping national art
within the state. 82

black market thrives because no alternative exists for either buyers or sellers, all
economic incentives are pushed in favor of the illegal trade.· Id. The harder to
obtain an item, the higher the demand for it on the black market. Id.
74. See Id.
75. See generally Prott & O'Keefe, supra note 37. Under the UNESCO Convention, each signatory state must initiate its own laws regulating the trade of cultural property and implementing the provisions of the Convention. UNESCO Convention, arts. 8 and 10.
Article 8 states: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to impose
penalties or administrative sanctions on any person responsible for infringing the
prohibitions referred to under articles 6(b) and 7(b) above.
Article 10 states: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to restrict by
education, information and vigilance, movement of cultural property illegally removed from any State Party to this Convention . . . •
76. Merryman, The Retention of Cultural Property, supra note 61, at 479 n.5.
See Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1036. Countries which export large amounts of art
and artifacts are commonly classified as "art rich," "art source," "countries of origin," and "artifact-rich." Id. These typically include Italy, Greece, Turkey, Eastern
Europe, Africa and Oceania. Collin, supra note 13, at 19.
77. John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 831, 832 (1986) [hereinafter Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking
About Cultural Property J. Most source countries attempt to retain art and artifacts
within their borders through national laws prohibiting the export of all objects
falling under the definition of "cultural property" or severely restricting their export by requiring government permission for export. Id.
78. Id.
79. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1044.
80.Id.
81. Short, supra note 33, at 659.
82. Id. at 658.
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In contrast, the laws of "art importing" or "art poor"83
nations encourage a more active art trade.54 These countries
often want to enrich their own cultural patrimony through
international sources. 85 Art importing nations also seek to
protect the "good faith purchasers" within their borders who do
not want to surrender possession of an object or be deprived of
compensation. 86 These nations contend that art should flow
where it is appreciated so it can be preserved and used for
archaeological research. 87 Furthermore, these nations assert
that a free art trade allows for a more appropriate display,
storage and conservation of art works, since many art source
nations do not possess the financial resources to care for their
overwhelming collections. 88 Therefore, many works are kept
eternally in storage, hidden from view, because the best examples of a particular artist, school or era are already on display
within the state. 89
Despite the myriad of present export laws, an art-importing nation is not required to comply with another country's
restrictions on the export of cultural property.90 No person
can bring an actionable claim against either the person who
brought the work into the country or the party that later acquired possession of the work merely on the basis of its illegal
export. 91 Therefore, the illegal export from one country generally does not bar lawful import into the major art market nations such as the United States, England, France, Germany
83. "Art poor" and "art importing" nations include Canada, the United States
and Great Britain. See Jessica L. Darraby, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNA·
TIONAL TRADE OF CULTURAL PROPERTY: DUTIES OF COLLECTORS, TRADERS AND
CLAIMANTS, PRACTICING LAw INSTITUTE, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK, PLI Order No. G4-3851, July 12, 1990, at
659, available on Westlaw [hereinafter Darraby]. "The source nations have the
cultural property and the retention laws. The market nations are the ones to
which the cultural property would be likely to go if the retention laws did not
exist or were evaded. Clearly, a nation may be both a source and a market."
Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36, at 65 n.5.
84. See generally Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36,
at 65 n.5.
85. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1044.
86.ld.
87.ld.
88. Short, supra note 33, at 659.
89. ld. at 660.
90. Bator, supra note 12, at 287.
91. ld.
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and Switzerland. 92
C. THE UNESCO CONVENTION AND OTHER ACCORDS AIMED AT
CURBING THE ILLICIT ART MARKET

Various international accords were created to remedy deficient national laws regarding the international traffic of stolen
art. 93 Three main pieces of legislation have attempted to curb
the illicit trade of cultural property.94 The first major international agreement was the UNESCO Convention of 1970. 95 The
second important piece of legislation, the United States Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983,96 was enacted by the
United States government to implement the UNESCO Convention. 97 In 1993, the European Union passed the third significant form of cultural property legislation, the EC Directive and
Regulation. 98
1. Provisions of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means
of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property
Since 1970, the "UNESCO Convention on the Means of
Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property" (hereinafter
"UNESCO Convention") has been the primary document for
restricting the illegal trafficking of art and cultural property.99 The UNESCO Convention was based primarily on public

92.Id.

93. See infra notes 99 - 198 and accompanying text.
94. Id.
95. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39. See infra notes 99-130.
96. See infra notes 131-148. Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2601-2613 (1988 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter CPIA].
97. Maritza F. Bolano, International Art Theft Disputes: Harmonizing Common
Law Principles with Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 129, 134 (1991/1992) [hereinafter Bolano].
98. See infra notes 166-191 and accompanying text.
Council Directive on the Return of Cultural Objects Unlawfully Removed
from the Territory of a Member State, March 15, 1993 O.J. (L 74174) (hereinafter
EC Directive).
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3911/92 of December 1992 on the Export of
Cultural Goods, 1992 O.J. (L 395/1) (hereinafter EC Regulation).
99. Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property (pt. 1), N.Y.
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international law and administrative law.lOo UNESCO Convention, like the export laws of most source nations, is based
on the premise that illicit traffic of cultural property can be reduced by implementing more extensive legal controls. 101
The UNESCO Convention requires, under Article 6, that a
country exporting an object of cultural property provide an
export certificate. l02 This requirement abolishes the right of
an art importing country to decide for itself what types of export controls it wishes to enforce. 103 The United States
strongly opposed this provision because it required giving
"blank check"l04 credit to a multitude of foreign export
laws. lOS As a result, the United States signed the UNESCO
Convention with a formal reservation to Article 6. 106
One of the most difficult provisions of the Convention to
implement is Article 7, which requires the return of stolen
cultural property and payment of restitution to the bona-fide
purchaser. 107 Under Article 7(a), the signatory states to the
Convention are obligated to prevent their "museums and similar institutions" from acquiring illegally exported works of
art. 108 However, the Convention qualifies this obligation by
LAw JOURNAL, March 3, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter Hoffmanl.
100. Id.
101. Merryman, Cultural Property Export Controls, supra note 36, at 95 n.S7.
102. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 6. Article 6 of the UNESCO
Convention provides: "The States Parties to this Convention undertake to introduce
an appropriate export certificate in which the exporting State would specify that
the export of the cultural property in question is authorized. The certificate should
accompany all items of cultural property exported in accordance with the regulation." Id.
103. Bator, supra note 12, at 377.
104. "Blank check" enforcement of another country's export laws prohibits the
import of cultural property without judging whether these laws are consistent with
United States substantive policies or interests. Id. at 32S.
105. Id. at 377. As a rule, the United States opposes giving any form of "blank
check" to foreign nations by prohibiting the import of cultural property based on
foreign export laws without judging whether these laws are consistent with its
substantive policies or interests. Id. at 32S. This would only serve to promote the
existing tendency of art source countries to place an embargo on virtually all art.
Id. at 329.
106. Bator, supra note 12, at 377. The United States reserved the "right to
determine whether or not to impose export controls over cultural property." Id.
107. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5.
lOS. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(a). Article 7(a) of the
UNESCO Convention provides in pertinent part:
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requiring its enforcement only to the extent that national legislation would impose the same. 109 Consequently, this clause
enables countries, like the United States, to allow museums to
acquire illegally exported works of art. 110
The UNESCO Convention limits the return of cultural
objects l l l to those stolen specifically from a museum, church
or similar institution. 112 Article 7(b)(ii) provides for the restitution of an illegally exported object on the payment of just
compensation to the bona-fide purchaser. 113 Since the Convention is treated as a federal treaty, this provision creates a
basis for foreign claimants to file suit for recovery under federal law when state property law would not provide a remeThe States Parties to the Convention undertake [t]o take
the necessary measures, consistent with national legisla.
tion, to prevent museums and similar institutions within
their territories from acquiring cultural property originat·
ing in another State Party which has been illegally exported after entry into force of this Convention, in the
States concerned.
Id. (emphasis added)
109. Id.
110. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 484-485. According to this clause, any country
that does not recognize foreign export restrictions is exempt from returning illegally exported works of art. Id.
111. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. The UNESCO Convention
defines "cultural property" as "property which, on religious or secular grounds
is ... of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science."
Id. However, each State is left to designate the specific items it considers cultural
property. Id.
112. Id. art. 7(b). Under Article 7(b), parties will undertake:
(i) [T]o prohibit the import of cultural property stolen
from a museum or a religious or secular public monument
or similar institution in another State Party to this Convention after the entry into force of this Convention for
the States concerned, provided that such property is documented as appertaining to the inventory of that institution;
Id.
113. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b)(ii). Under the relevant
provisions in Article 7(b), parties will undertake:
(ii) at the request of the State Party of origin, to take
appropriate steps to recover and return any such cultural
property imported after entry into force of this Convention
in both States concerned, provided, however, that the
resulting State shall pay just compensation to an innocent
purchaser or to a person who has valid title to that property.
Id.
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dy.1l4 However, Article 7(b)(ii) can be invoked only by a museum, a religious or secular public monument or similar institution which had documented its possession of the object before
the theft occurred. 115 Therefore, the UNESCO Convention affords no remedy for a private individual or institution that has
suffered a similar theft. 116
Another provision of the UNESCO Convention allows
signatory nations to call upon each other in emergency situations and enforce each other's cultural property laws. ll7 Specifically, Article 9 provides for the ad hoc application of import
controls on specific archaeological and ethnological materials
where pillage of these objects has jeopardized a country's· national patrimony. us However, Article 9 only calls for signatory states to make a concerted effort to carry out the "necessary
concrete measures" to protect the pillaged objects rather than
requiring blanket import restrictions. 119 The United States
was one of thirteen countries that urged the adoption of Article
9 as a substitute for the ''blank check" approach of automatically enforcing the export laws of every foreign nation. 120 This
"crisis provision" encourages action when a cultural patrimony
is in serious danger.121

114. Bator, supra note 12, at 382-83. Furthennore, the U.S. government is obligated to aid in effectuating the seizure and return of stolen art. [d. at 382.
115. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b)(i).
116. See [d.
117. [d. at art. 9.

118. Bator, supra note 12, at 340. Article 9 provides that:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may call upon other States Parties
who are affected. The States Parties to this Convention
undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry
out the necessary concrete measures, including the control
of exports and imports and international commerce in the
specific material concerned. Pending agreement each State
concerned shall take provisional measures to the extent
feasible to prevent irremediable injury to the cultural
heritage of the requesting State.
UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 9.
119. Bator, supra note 12, at 340.
120. [d. at 399
121. [d. at 340. Bator states that the two types of pillage contemplated are,
"the case in which the remains of a particular civilization are threatened with
destruction or wholesale removal . . . and the case in which the international
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The UNESCO Convention has aroused some criticism. For
example, respected authorities have argued that the UNESCO
Convention places more importance on national hoarding than
on the international protection of art and cultural property. 122
By condoning state ownership laws and restrictive export controls, these critics contend that the UNESCO Convention allows innumerable objects to remain "undocumented, unhoused,
unprotected, and undiscovered . . . ,,123 The provisions for resolving disputes are biased toward art source nations since the
litigation costs are allocated "almost exclusively" to the art
importing nations that act as the venue for claims for the return of cultural property.124 Furthermore, the UNESCO Convention fails to harmonize the multitude of national laws addressing the transferability of title of stolen property or procedural rules regarding burden of proof. 125
The UNESCO Convention's most serious problem remains
that many of the principal art market countries that would be
affected by the accord are not signatories to it.126 The United
market for certain items has stimulated the widespread illegal excavations destructive of important archaeological resources." Id.
122. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1045, n.33. According to Professor Merryman,
the UNESCO Convention appears to be based on a principle of "cultural nationalism" that places more importance on national hoarding than on international protection of cultural property. Id.
123. Id. at 1055.
124. Lisa J. Borodkin, Note: The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 389 (1995) [hereinafter Borodkin).
125. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. In common law countries, a seller cannot
transfer better title than he or she has. See Id. Therefore even a good faith purchaser can never obtain good title from a thief. See Id. In civil law countries, if a
buyer purchases a piece of art in good faith that it was not stolen, he or she
acquires good title and has the right to keep the art. Vitrano, supra note 6, at
1166.
126. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1054. M9jor art-importing nations which have
refused to sign the UNESCO Convention include France, Germany, Japan, The
Netherlands, the Scandinavian nations, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. John
H. Merryman & James A.R. Nafziger, The Private International Law of Cultural
Property in the United States, AM. J. COMPo L., 221, 242 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter
Merryman & Nafziger]. This problem is significant due to the lex situs rule, namely that the law of the country where the transfer of stolen property took place
governs any suit for the return of that property. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7.
The UNESCO Convention is clearly inapplicable in an enormous number of cases
since "more than 80% of the antiquities trade takes place in non-signatory nations." Harold Burman, executive director of the US Secretary of State's Advisory
Committee on Private International Law and the State Department representative
on the three-member U.S. delegation to UNIDROIT, quoted in Id.
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Kingdom refused to sign the UNESCO Convention because its
definition of cultural property is over-inclusive, interferes with
rights of ownership, and the requirements on art dealers are
unnecessarily bureaucratic. 127 Several countries find the
UNESCO Convention conflicts with other umbrella agreements
regarding free trade. 128 The United States ratified the
UNESCO Convention in 1972 but waited ten years before
implementing its provisions with the passage of the Cultural
Property Implementation Act in 1983. 129 Although over 80
nations ratified the UNESCO Convention, only six art importing nations have signed the treaty and adopted legislation for
its implementation. 130
2. United States Implementation of the UNESCO Convention:
Cultural Property Implementation Act of 1983

The United States' Cultural Property Implementation Act
of 1983 131 (hereinafter "the CPIA") effected legislation corresponding with Articles 7 and 9 of the UNESCO Convention. 132 Through the CPIA, Congress aimed to prevent the importation of stolen cultural property from other nations and
facilitate legal actions by foreign governments for the return of
cultural property.133 The CPIA enables the President of the
United States to enter into a bilateral or multilateral agreement with other nations to implement import restrictions on
artifacts that are in danger of destruction.

127. Barbara Hoffman, How UNIDROIT Protects Cultural Property (pt.2), N.Y.
LAw JOURNAL, March 10, 1995, 5, 11.

128. Mastalir, supra note 54, at 1054.
129. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 485. This ten year delay is attributed to a battle
in Congress involving those who favored the protective efforts of the Convention
(i.e art historians and archaeologists) and those who disagreed with the measures
used by it (i.e. art dealers). Id. at 485-86.
130. Hoffman, supra note 98, at 7. These countries include Argentina, Australia,
Cansda, Italy, the United States and Switzerland. Id.
131. 19 U.S.C. §2601-2613, supra note 96.
132. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10.
133. Bolano, supra note 97, at 134. The CPIA is designed to "prohibit the importation of stolen cultural property from the institutions of other signatory nations, to assist in the recovery of cultural property, to exercise import controls.
over cultural property, and to facilitate legal actions to recover cultural property
upon request by a State Party." Id.
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Section 2606 of the CPIA explicitly implements Article 7 of
the UNESCO Convention, providing protection for stolen cultural property.l34 The CPIA enforces Article 7 by requiring
importers to obtain an export certificate from the source country for any work of art qualifying as "archaeological or ethnological material."135 However, this protection applies only to
stolen cultural property within the definition of the UNESCO
Convention,136 property that has been inventoried and is appurtenant to a foreign museum, religious or secular institution
or public monument. 137 The CPIA does not specifically pertain to artifacts, either lawfully excavated or looted, if they do
not "appertain" to the inventory of an appropriate institution
at the time of theft.138 Furthermore, the CPIA applies only to
cultural property stolen after the statute's effective date, January 12, 1983, or after the date that a State Party enters into a
reciprocal agreement with the United States, whichever is
later. 139
Section 2602 explicitly implements Article 9 by inviting
signatory governments to the UNESCO Convention to call
upon the President of the United States for aid in recovering
documented stolen cultural property, pursuant to a bilateral or
multilateral agreement. l40 At the request of a foreign country, the U.S. Customs Service can enforce that nation's export
laws within the United States by seizing designated archaeological or ethnological material if the importer is unable to
present an export certificate. 141 However, in order to enter
into a bilateral agreement to obtain this assistance, the requesting nation must meet complicated preconditions to prove
134. See Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10.
135. 19 U.S.C. §2606 (1995). The Act only considers objects which are over 250
years old to be of "archaeological interest" and subject to import restrictions. 19
U.S.C. § 2601(2) (Supp. 1994).
136. See supra note 111, citing the UNESCO Convention's definition of cultural
property.
137. 19 u.S.C. § 2607 (1995).
138. Darraby, supra note 83.
139. 19 U.S.C. §2607 (1995).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1995).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1995). However, an importer is excused from presenting
an export certificate to U.S. Customs officials if there is "satisfactory evidence"
that the material was exported from the State Party at least ten years before the
date of importation and that the importer has not owned it for more than one
year. [d.
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import restrictions are necessary. 142 To date, the United
States has entered into a bilateral treaty with Mexico,l43 and
executive agreements with Ecuador,144 Guatemala,14s
Peru/46 Bolivia147 and El Salvador.l46
The United States has not resolved the fundamental issue
of what constitutes a "stolen" object for the purposes of implementing import restrictions or providing for the return of cultural property.149 The leading case regarding claims of ownership of cultural property by foreign countries is U.S. v.
McClain. 1so In McClain, an art dealer knowingly excavated
pre-Columbian artifacts in violation of Mexican law, subsequently smuggling them into the United States and selling
them. 151 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of four American citizens for conspiring to receive and
transport unregistered artifacts through interstate commerce,
142. Darraby, supra note 83. Under the CPIA, the requesting state must prove
1) its cultural patrimony is in jeopardy due to the pillage of archaeological or
ethnological materials; 2) it has already taken measures to protect the cultural
patrimony; 3) the requested restrictions would provide a "substantial benefit" in
preventing a "serious situation of pillage" if other nations that have a significant
import trade in such archaeological or ethnological material apply similar restrictions within a reasonable amount of time; 4) less drastic remedies are not available and 5) the import restrictions are consistent with the general interest of the
international community. [d. See 19 U.S.C. § 2602 (1995).
143. See Treaty of Cooperation Between the United States of America and the
United Mexican States Providing for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, July 17, 1970, U.S.-Mex., 22 U.S.T.
494.
144. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Ecuador for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, Nov. 17, 1983, U.S.-Ecuador, T.I.A.S. No. 11,075.
145. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Guatemala for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and
Cultural Properties, May 21, 1984, U.S.-Guat., T.I.A.S. No. 11,077.
146. See Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of
Peru for the Recovery and Return of Stolen Archaeological, Historical, and Cultural Properties, Sept. 15, 1991, U.S.-Peru., 33 U.S.T. 1607.
147. The United States granted Bolivia's request for protection of antique ceremonial textiles form Coroma, Bolivia. See Import Restrictions on Cultural Textile
Artifacts from Bolivia, 54 Fed. Reg. 10,61819 (1989).
148. The United States agreed to grant protection to pre-Hispanic artifacts from
EI Salvador's Cara Sucia Archaeological Region. See Import Restrictions on Archaeological Material from EI Salvador, 52 Fed. Reg. 34,61416 (1987).
149. Darraby, supra note 83. No American statute, including the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) and CPIA, defines what constitutes "stolen." [d.
150. 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977).
151. [d. at 993.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1996

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 6

650

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:627

under the National Stolen Property Act (hereinafter
"NSPA,,).152
The McClain court relied on Mexican law to determine
that the artifacts had been "stolen," thereby finding a violation
of the NSPA. 153 Therefore, pursuant to McClain, an object
will be considered "stolen" if a nation's law clearly declares
national ownership of cultural goods. 154 The McClain holding
eliminates the distinction between "stolen" and "illegally exported" cultural property.155 The ruling also contradicts the
long-standing U.S. policy of opposition to agreements that give
foreign nations the right to prosecute U.S. citizens according to
their nation's legislation regarding cultural property.156 Despite its controversial implications, McClain has not been successfully applied in a replevin action since its decision in
1977. 157 Furthermore, the decision is not binding outside the
Fifth Circuit or in an international law context. 15S After
McClain, the United States courts have made it very difficult
for foreign governments seeking the return of cultural property
to prove ownership.159
In order to obtain the return of cultural property, the
United States requires a government to establish and prove
that the object was found or excavated at a site within its
territory.160 It must also show that its laws vested the state
with ownership at the time of the removal. 161 In the case Peru v. Johnson,162 the Peruvian government filed a civil action
in the Federal District Court in California for the return of

152. Id. at 992. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2320.
153. Merryman & Nafziger, supra note 126, at 228.
154. Claudia Fox, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects; An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural
Property, 9 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'y 225, 234 (1993) [hereinafter Fox].
155. [d.
156. Id. at 235.
157. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10.
158. Darraby, supra note 83.
159. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10.
160. Id.
161. [d. at 10. Governments that have failed to meet the McClain proof of
ownership requirements include Peru, which sought the return of artifacts it
claimed were stolen from the Sipan tomb in 1986, and Croatia and Hungary
which tried to recover the "Sevso Treasure." Id.
162. Government of Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
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some artifacts it claimed had been illegally exported. 163 However, the court found that Peru failed to prove that these artifacts actually carne from Peru or that Peruvian law vested title
in the State at the time of export. 164
3. The European Community's Alternative to the UNESCO
Convention: The EC Regulation and Directive Regarding
Cultural Property 165
As a consequence of encouraging free trade among the

member states, the enforcement of export restrictions on cultural property and the detection of stolen art objects has become more difficult. 166 Therefore, efforts to unify the European states have actually facilitated art theft within the European Union. 167 In 1993, the European Community (hereinafter
"EC") eliminated internal border checks and terminated passport verification of people passing from one EC member state
to another in accordance with Article 8A of the EEC Treaty.16S Baggage checks are no longer done for travel by land,
air or sea within the internal borders of the EC. 169 As a result, a thief smuggling a work of art from one European member state to another no longer has to worry about being
stopped and searched at the border. 170 In addition, the inter163. Id. at 811.
164. Id. at 812-14.
165. See infra n.97.
166. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30.
167. Dourian, supra note 31, at A30. Florence Hardinge, marketing director of
the Art Loss Register stated, " . . . art has become a movable currency and as the
barriers come down, this will be easier because there will be no customs control. n
Id.
The Art Loss Register is a London based private organization that aims to
deter art theft by working with insurance companies and the fine art industry to
register photographs and descriptions of valuable art in an international computer
database. See Radcliffe, supra note 12.
168. Short, supra note 33, at 643. Article 8A of the EEC Treaty provides:
The Community shall adopt measures with the aim of
progressively establishing the internal market over a
period expiring on 31 December 1992. . . .the internal
market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers
in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions
of this Treaty.
cited in Id. at 641 n.44.
169. Id. at 643.
170. See generally Godfrey Barker, Downtown Goes Out of Town Round-up, THE
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national black market,171 a network of art dealers who launder illicit art, can move works of art very quickly. 172
In response to growing concerns over increased art theft,
the Member States of the European Union implemented a
Regulation (hereinafter "Regulation") and a Directive (hereinafter "Directive") regarding the export of cultural property.173
The EEC Treaty permits restrictions on import and export for
the protection of national art treasures. 174 According to Article 36, each member state may pass its own legislation to protect its "national treasures," thereby giving authority for the
Regulation and Directive. 175 However, since the EEC Treaty
is based on the principle of free trade, Article 36 specifically
prohibits measures which claim to protect cultural property
but in fact merely act to restrict intra-community trade. 176
The Regulation requires that any object of cultural property being removed from the European Community be accompanied by an export certificate. 177 The definition of what constitutes "cultural property" is left to the individual Member
States and has been broadly construed. 17s In addition, the

DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 30, 1994 at 16, quoting James Emson of Art Loss Register. Emson states, "stolen goods can be spirited out of the country very quickly
and easily now the boundaries are down in Europe." Id.
171. The black market of cultural property is a highly complex and organized
system made up of local and foreign dealers. Bator, supra note 12, at 292. Corrupt
and inefficient local officials permit the transport of art out of the country by
automobile, train, plane and helicopter. Id.
172. Tuohy, supra note 8, at 4. Jean-Michel Mimerand, director of the Office for
Repression of Art Thefts, in Paris explains that "criminal networks are well organized to get the merchandise out to transit countries very quickly." Id.
173. EC Regulation, supra note 98; EC Directive, supra note 98.
174. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, at art. 36. Article 36 states that the Treaty
provisions eliminating trade restrictions between the Member States "shall not
preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit justifies on the grounds of . . . the protection of national treasures possessing artistic,
historic or archaeological value . . . " Id.
175. Id. Article 36 provides: "The provisions of Article 30 and 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports, or goods in transit [to protect] . .. national treasures possessing artistic, historic or archaeological value ..." Id.
176. Id. Article 36 concludes by providing: "Such prohibitions or restrictions
shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States." Id.
177. EC Regulation, supra note 98.
178. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5,

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/6

26

Olivier: UNIDROIT Convention

1996]

UNIDROIT CONVENTION

653

Annex to the Regulation provides a list of categories to which
the EC Member States agree the Regulation will apply. 179
The Regulation is based on the premise that by requiring export certificates to accompany objects of cultural property leaving the EC, Member States will be able to show that an object
was illegally exported if the purchaser of an object cannot
produce the certificate. ISO Nevertheless, since the Regulation
did not take effect until January 1, 1993, a significant number
of objects exported before that date will not have the export
certificate that is now required. 181 Therefore, despite the
Regulation's intentions, a Member State will not be able to
prove that the purchaser obtained an object in bad faith based
merely on the absence of an export certificate. 182
The Directive establishes the legal procedures for the return of cultural property that has been illegally exported from
one EC Member State into another.l83 The Directive also permits a Member State to request the return of a cultural object
that is found in the territory of another Member State. l84 Upon such a request, the latter must either act to preserve the
object, prevent any action to evade the return procedure or act
as an intermediary between the possessor and the requesting
Member State. l85 The Directive does not distinguish between
"stolen" and "illegally exported" and applies only to "national
treasures possessing artistic, historic, or archaeological value."I86 Only national governments are permitted to bring suit
at 16.
179. EC Regulation, supra note 98, at art. 1. The Regulation's Preamble states
the Annex "is aimed at making clear categories of cultural goods which should be
given particular protection in trade with third countries, but is not intended to
prejudice the definition, by Member States, of national treasures within the meaning of Article 36 of the Treaty . . . " [d. at preamble.
180. Vitrano, supra note 6, at 1195.
181. [d. at 1196.
182. [d.
183. EC Directive, supra note 98.
184. [d. art. 4.
185. [d. However, according to J.L. Hill of Farrer & Co., a solicitor specializing
in cultural property in the United Kingdom, the Directive's procedures for the
return of cultural property have been criticized for being too bureaucratic to implement. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11.
186. EC Directive, supra note 98, art. 1. The EC Directive requires that an
object 1) be a national treasure as defined by the Member State's own laws, 2) fit
within one of the acknowledged categories of art, and 3) have been exported from
an EC Member State after January 1, 1993. [d. art. 1 and 13.
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against the possessor of a stolen object for its return, and the
action must be brought within one year of discovering the
object's location or identity of its possessor. 187 The Directive
also requires the requesting State to provide fair compensation
provision to the dispossessed owner if he or she exercised due
diligence in acquiring the object. 188
From the standpoint of art market nations, the Regulation
and Directive appear to inhibit the export of cultural property
from the European Community by providing the "unconditional
Community enforcement of the export controls of each of the
member nations. "189 In effect, the Regulation and Directive
impose the export controls of each EC Member State on art
importing nations around the world. 190 Even within the European Community there is concern that the broad definitions of
"cultural property" that countries such as Italy maintain are
actually a pretext for restricting trade and a clear violation of
Article 36. 191
The need for strong, uniform legislation to resolve issues
related to stolen cultural property has become increasingly
apparent,192 and although the UNESCO Convention was designed to control the trafficking of illegally exported or stolen
cultural property, the Convention has been largely ineffective. 193 The myriad of laws and legislation established by individual countries only further complicates matters.l94 Mean187. Id. art. 7.1. Restitution proceedings must be undertaken not more than
thirty years after the object has been illegally exported from the Member State
which is seeking restitution. Id. However, the requesting state has a seventy-five
year period in which to request the return of an object belonging to a public collection. Id.
188. EC Directive, supra note 98, at arts. 9-11.
189. Merryman, A Licit International Trade in Cultural Objects, supra note 5,
at 16.
190. Id.
191. Collin, supra note 13, at 39.
192. See infra notes 17-33 and accompanying text discussing the problems of
private theft and looting.
193. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. Georgina Adam describes the UNESCO
Convention as ~spectacularly unsuccessful" in facilitating the return of lost and
smuggled art. Georgina Adam, They're Out To Steal Our Stolen Art, THE DAILY
TELEGRAPH, May 22, 1995, at 16 [hereinafter Adam).
194. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. Hoffman states, ~In part, the lack of harmo·
ny of national laws on the transferability of title to property sold by a thief, as
well as substantive law and procedural rules allocation burden of proof facilitates
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while no exhaustive compilation of national cultural property
export laws exists. 195 To remedy the deficiencies that caused
the UNESCO Convention to be futile, UNESCO requested that
UNIDROIT 196 draft a new international accord ·addressing
the problems of illicit art theft. 197 The final draft of the
UNIDROIT Convention was adopted in June 1995. 198
III. DISCUSSION: EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION
The escalating problem of illegal art trafficking and the
difficulties of implementing the UNESCO Convention's restitution provisions prompted the drafting of a new international
treaty, the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally
Exported Cultural Objects (hereinafter ''UNIDROIT Convention,,).199 In comparing the UNIDROIT Convention to its predecessor, UNIDROIT aims to remedy UNESCO's deficiencies. 20o In addition, UNIDROIT attempts to establish a unified private law code for resolving international claims demanding the restitution of stolen cultural objects and the return of illegally exported objects. 201 In doing so, the
UNIDROIT Convention seeks to harmonize civil law and common law property principles in order to maximize the number
of nations signing the Convention. 202 The UNIDROIT Convention will be open for signature until June 30, 1996. 203

the laundering of and illicit trade in 8tolen art and antiquities." [d.
195. Darraby, supra note 83.
196. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5. UNIDROIT, a French term meaning "one
law," is an acronym for the International Institute for the Unification of Private
Law, an international organization based in Rome which is working to create a
uniform system of law within the European Union. [d.
197. Adam, supra note 193, at 16.
198. Final Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft
UNIDROIT Convention on the International Return of Stolen or lllegally Exported
Cultural Objects, May 24, 1995, 3 n.15. International diplomatic officials adopted
the UNIDROIT Convention on June 23, 1995, at a UNIDROIT Conference in
Rome. [d.
199. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 5.
200. [d. at 7.
201. [d. at 10.
202. Fox, supra note 154, at 231.
203. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 11. Pursuant to Article 11,
the UNIDROIT Convention is subject to ratification by the States who have signed
it. Id.
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A. CLAIMS FOR CULTURAL PROPERTy204 UNDER THE
UNIDROIT CONVENTION

Claims for cultural property under the UNIDROIT Convention differ in two ways from the UNESCO Convention.
First, the UNIDROIT Convention uses private international
law. 205 Second, while the UNESCO Convention only provides
for claims brought from signatory governments to other signatory governments, the UNIDROIT Convention implies that
private parties are allowed to bring suit in the court of another
signatory nation for the return of stolen artwork.206
The UNIDROIT Convention institutes the common law
principle that "stolen" articles of cultural property should be
returned to their true owner. 207 This provision opposes the
civil law notion that one who innocently purchases a stolen
object as a bona fide purchaser is released from returning
it.208 Under Article 3, the claimant must bring an action for
restitution for an object stolen from a private collection within
three years from the time they know or reasonably should
have known the location of the object and the identity of its
possessor. 209 Representatives for public collections have a 75-

204. [d. at art. 2. Article 2 provides: "For the purposes of this Convention,
cultural objects are those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance
for archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, art or science . . . " [d. These are
the same as those listed in Article 1 of the UNESCO Convention. See UNESCO
Convention, supra note 39, at art. 1. This broad definition leaves the courts to
detennine whether a work of art is of requisite importance to be returned to its
true owner under the Convention. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 495.
205. Lenzner, supra note 3, at 492.
206. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. Pursuant to Article 7(b), the UNESCO
Convention only gives rise to claims made by a museum, church or similar institution. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7(b).
207. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3. Article 3.1 states, "The
possessor of a cultural object which has been stolen shall return it." [d.
208. Collin, supra note 13, at 22.
209. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note lO, art. 3. Article 3.3 provides: "Any
claim for restitution shall be brought within a period of three years from the time
when the claimant knew the location of the cultural object and the identity of its
possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the time of the
theft." [d.
UNIDROIT imposed a statute of limitations as an incentive to art importing
nations to make them exempt from suits for the recovery of stolen art and archaeological objects after specific period of time. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. However, the implementation of the "discovery rule" is a concession to art source na-
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year period to reclaim any stolen property.210 However, there
is concern that a statute of limitations will allow the possessors of stolen cultural property to hide these objects until the
time period has run. 211
B. REASONABLE COMPENSATION FOR THE DISPOSSESSED
OWNER

To attract art importing nations, the UNIDROIT Convention provides for reasonable compensation for the dispossessed
owner of stolen cultural property.212 However, to receive such
compensation, art purchasers have the responsibility of exercising "due diligence" in verifying that the works they are
buying are not stolen or illicit.213 Under Article 4.1, the possessor of stolen cultural property is provided "fair and reason-

tions who seek the longest period of time in which to bring a claim for the recovery of stolen cultural property. See ld.
210. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.5. Article 3.5 provides:
[a]ny Contracting State may declare that a claim is subject to a time limitation of 75 years or such longer period
as is provided in its law. A claim made in another Contracting State for restitution of a cultural object displaced
from a monument, archaeological site or public collection
in a Contracting State making such a declaration shall
also be subject to that time limitation.
ld.
A "public collection is defined in Article 3.7 as:
a group of inventoried or otherwise identified cultural
objects owned by:
(a) a Contracting State
(b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting State
(c) a religious institution in a Contracting State; or
(d) an institution that is established for an essentially
cultural, educational or scientific purpose in a Contracting
State and is recognized in that State as serving the public interest.
ld. at art. 3.7.
211. Fox, supra note 154, at 237.
212. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11.
213. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.1. Article 4.1 states:
The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to return it shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to
payment of fair and reasonable compensation provided
that the possessor neither. knew nor ought reasonably to
have known that the object was stolen and can prove that
it exercised due diligence when acquiring the object.
ld.
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able compensation" as long as he or she had no knowledge that
the object was stolen. 214 Art importing nations favor requiring the payment of compensation to good faith purchasers
because it would discourage suits for the return of property if
the original owner could not pay.21S In addition, to receive
reasonable compensation under UNIDROIT, good faith purchasers must prove that they used "due diligence" in verifying
that the work of art had not been stolen. 216 Article 4.4 would
require possessors of stolen objects to prove that they exercised
the due diligence that a "reasonable person would have in the
circumstances." 2l70ne would attempt to prove such due diligence by indicating the character of the parties to the acquisition, the price paid and certifying that they consulted a register for stolen cultural objects.21s
Usually, a good faith purchaser will be able to prove his or
her "due diligence" by providing the object's export certificate. 219 The requirement of "due diligence" was intended to

214. Id. This provision also serves to penalize those who are not concerned with
whether or not an object has a legitimate title. Hoffman supra note 127, at 11.
215. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. UNIDROIT does not define "reasonable
compensation." Id. Instead, it requires courts to make this determinations. Id.
Factors that could be taken into account include the fair market value of the
object, the intrinsic value of the object in its source country, the acquisition price
paid by the good faith purchaser and costs paid for preservation and restoration.
Id.
216. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 4.l.
217. Id. at art. 4.4. Article 4.4 specifies:
In determining whether the possessor exercised due diligence, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the
acquisition, including the character of the parties, the
price paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any
other relevant information and documentation which it
could reasonably have obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step
that a reasonable person would have taken in the circumstances.
Id.
218. Id.
219. Richard A. Rothman & James F. Fitzpatrick, Statement of Position of Concerned Members of the American Cultural Community Regarding the UNIDROIT
Convention on the International Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Objects, May
31, 1995, at 26 [hereinafter the White Paper]. A group of prominent United States
art dealers, museums and auction houses officially voiced their opposition to several provisions of the UNIDROIT Convention in what has become known as the
"White Paper." See generally Id.
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incite art dealers to provide proper documentation for objects
they sell and deal strictly with objects with legitimate title. 220
Problems will undoubtedly arise because many objects left
their source countries decades or centuries before such a certificate was required. 221 In other cases, the original export certificate may have been lost, discarded or simply never transferred by a previous owner.222 Consequently, an expected repercussion is the forgery of documents provided by dealers to
art buyers who demand export certificates and documentation
to meet the standard of "due diligence" and thus avoid title disputes. 223
C. UNIDROIT'S DEFINITION OF "STOLEN PROPERTY"
The UNIDROIT Convention also differs from the UNESCO
Convention regarding excavated objects, especially those which
have been subject to looting. 224 More importantly, Article 3.2
states that "objects that have been unlawfully excavated or
lawfully excavated and unlawfully retained" are considered
stolen. 225 UNIDROIT added this provision in response to the
critical problem of looting at undocumented excavations. 226
Conversely, the United States museum community and

The White Paper cites to a UNIDROIT Staff Report that states "the aim of
[Article 8] is to exclude the possibility of the possessor's successfully invoking its
good faith, and hence being entitled to compensation, in the absence of an export
certificate for an object which is required by the law of the Contracting State from
which the object has been removed." [d. at n.37.
220. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. This would force dealers and auction
houses to change their present practice of keeping the names of sellers confidential. [d.
221. White Paper, supra note 219, at 28.
222. [d. Apparently, this is a common occurrence when an object is passed
through inheritance or donation. [d.
223. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11.
224. Hoffman, supra note 99, at 10.
225. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 3.2. Article 3.2 states: "For
the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object which has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen,
when consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place." rd.
226. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 5. The Appendix of the Convention expresses
concern over the "pillage of archaeological sites and the resulting loss of irreplaceable archaeological, historical and scientific infonnation . . . " UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at Appendix.
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commercial art dealers demanded that Article 3.2 be deleted
from the UNIDROIT Convention. 227 These groups strongly
oppose "found in the ground" laws that transform foreign export regulations into theft.228 They contend that Article 3.2's
definition of stolen property, by including illegally exported
objects, "is far broader than U.S. law or any common understanding of the term."229 This provision would require even
an innocent purchaser, who paid full value for an object, to
return it to a government which had neither possession nor
actual ownership of that object.230 Furthermore, the commercial art world argues that the legal trade of antiquities will be
burdened by preventing the export of "redundant secondary"
objects and will create additional apprehension within the art
market. 231 Other critics argue this provision is excessive because it illegitimizes otherwise legal forms of art trade. 232

227. White Paper, supra note 219, at 21. The White Paper states that the deletion of Article 3.2 is "critical." [d. Instead, it proposes that "stolen property" be
defined as it is in the Cultural Property Implementation Act. [d. at 21 n.24. This
definition limits stolen property to those documented objects which were removed
from an institution. [d. Alternatively, the definition of "stolen property" could be
based on the traditional United States legal concept that property taken from an
individual or entity is "stolen." [d.
228. White Paper, supra note 219, at 22. Professor John Merryman states: "Museums have a purpose. Collectors and dealers can be engaged in legitimate activity. The fact that a piece came from a particular country does not automatically
give that country an overpowering right to it. It might be better taken care of,
better displayed, seen by more people, in a museum in a different country," quoted
in Walsh, supra note 25, at 88.
229. White Paper, supra note 219, at 20. The commercial art world argues that
by including illegally excavated objects, Article 3.2 creates too broad a category of
objects that would be subject to mandatory return. [d. Under this provision, the
government of the source country could demand return of an object of which it
"never had possession, or actual ownership . . . " [d.
230. [d.

231. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 5.
232. Interview with John H. Merryman, Sweitzer Professor of Law, Stanford
University Law School (Sept. 30, 1995) [hereinafter Merryman interview]. According to Professor Merryman, article 3.2 is excessive because it gives foreign export
laws "blank check" application in the United States, a policy this country has
always rejected. [d. The lawful professions of art dealing, art collecting and museum management are made illegitimate by overly retentive cultural property laws
of foreign nations. [d.
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D. THE RECOVERY OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL
OBJECTS

Another highly controversial feature of the UNIDROIT
Convention is its provision requiring that illegally exported
cultural property be returned to its source country.233 This is
a significantly departure from the UNESCO Convention which
eliminated any obligation to do SO.234 In effect, Article 5
would require the United States to enforce foreign export laws
regardless of whether these laws are desirable or serve national or global interests. 235 Furthermore, since most foreign cultural property laws prohibit the export of any cultural objects
"found in the ground," a foreign government could rely on Article 5 for the return of illegally exported objects even if Article 3
was deleted. 236 Critics of this provision argue that by agreeing to abide by Article 5, the United States would be giving
"blank. check" enforcement of any form of export law a foreign
government may enact. 237 Consequently, the United States
museum and art dealer community urge the United States to
reject the UNIDROIT Convention as long as Article 5 remains
a provision. 238
The criteria an object must meet in order to justify its
return to its source country, outlined in Article 5.3, have proven highly controversial. 239 According to Article 5.3 of the final

233. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. Article 5.1 states "A Contracting State
may request the court or other competent authority of another Contracting State
to order the return of a cultural object illegally exported from the territory of the
requesting State." UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.
234. UNESCO Convention, supra note 39, at art. 7. See supra note 108-110 and
accompanying text for discussion of UNESCO art. 7(a).
235. White Paper, supra note 219, at 23-24.
236. ld. at 22.
237. ld. at 30. As a result, American museums would be precluded from collecting any range of works and those who visit these museums would be deprived of
learning about these forms of art. ld.
238. ld. at 21-22.
239. Merryman Interview, supra note 232. The 1993 Draft UNIDROIT Convention contained these criteria in article 5.2. See 1993 Draft Convention, infra note
241, at art. 5.2. However, the final UNIDROIT Convention lists these same criteria under article 5.3. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art.5.3. The
American museum community and art trade voiced their demand for the deletion
of article 5.2 (1993 Draft Convention) in the White Paper. White Paper, supra
note 219, at 24. They argued that the criteria of article 5.2 allows for such a
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draft, a foreign government can obtain the return of illegally
exported cultural property through an administrative body or
court, provided it can establish that the object "significantly
impairs: the physical integrity of the object or of its context;
the integrity of a complex object; the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific or historical character; the
traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous
community, or establishes that the object is of significant cultural importance for the requesting State."240 These criteria
are significantly looser than those contained in the preliminary
draftS. 241 Art importing nations, such as Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United Kingdom proposed limiting the definition of cultural property to objects of "outstanding
cultural significance.,,242 Countries that are rich in artifacts
and want to retain them, including Greece, Iran, Mexico, Nepal
and Turkey, lobbied to add another category of cultural property: objects of "significance for natural heritage."243 Although
the final draft of the UNIDROIT Convention incorporates neither of these proposals, the definition of cultural property encompasses the broad definition favored by art source nations. 244
The American archaeological community supports this
provision so that a public agency of the United States could

broad definition of "cultural property" that U.S. courts would be required to en·
force all foreign export and cultural property laws. [d. at 23.
240. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.3. (emphasis added)
241. Merryman interview, supra note 232.
Article 5.2 of the 1993 draft UNIDROIT Convention allows for the return of
cultural property if its removal "significantly impairs" one or more of the following
interests:
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its con·
text,
(b) the integrity of a complex object,
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a sci·
entific or historical character,
(d) the use of the object by a living culture,
or establishes that the object is of outstanding cultural
importance for the requesting State.
Preliminary Draft UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects, Study LXX - Doc. 40, at art. 5.2, 1993 [hereinafter 1993 Draft Convention]. (emphasis added)
242. Borodkin, supra note 124, at 380 n.15.
243. [d.
244. See generally, White Paper, supra note 219, at 23.
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bring a claim in a foreign court for the return of objects removed in violation of a tribal, state or local law. 245 Meanwhile, the commercial art market disagrees with the criteria of
Article 5.2 because the scope of objects eligible for return is too
broad and will make a significant amount of the art trade
illegitimate, only to encourage the over-retention of art in
source nations. 246 A government may obtain the return of an
object by merely showing that the object is of "significant cultural importance" for the requesting State."247 Consequently,
the American museum and art dealing community describe the
burden created by Article 5.3 as meaningless.,,248
As the UNIDROIT Convention provides no guidelines
quantifying an object's cultural importance, a country will need
only to obtain an expert to testify that the object is indeed of
"significant cultural importance" to meet this vague standard. 249 The museum and art dealing community contends
that, as a result, the United States will have to enforce all
foreign export and cultural property laws. 25o

IV. CONCLUSION
Although the illicit art market is thriving and will undoubtedly continue to be a lucrative form of business, effective
legislation governing the legitimate flow of cultural property
could minimize the demand for black market art trade and
promote the protection of national treasures. 251 The free flow
245. Hoffman, supra note 127, at 11. The U.S. Department of the Interior,
which has legal and regulatory responsibility for the preservation and protection of
archaeological objects in this country also supported the extension of protection to
"illegally exported cultural objects." [d. at 5.
246. Merryman interview, supra note 232.
247. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art. 5.3.
248. White Paper, supra note 219, at 22. The wording of the draft Convention,
which the White Paper opposed, required a government to prove an object was of
"outstanding cultural importance" to obtain its return. 1993 Draft Convention,
supra note 241, at art. 5.2. (emphasis added). However, the final UNIDROIT Convention, passed one month after the White Paper was submitted, creates an even
less stringent standard than the wording of the draft Convention. See generally,
supra note 240.
249. White Paper, supra note 219, at 23.
250. [d.
251. Stille, supra note 42, at 33. Professor Merryman believes "as much aboveground movement of cultural property is a good thing all around. There should be
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of art can be balanced with the desire to retain objects of cultural significance if source countries agree to allow secondary
pieces to go to foreign museums while keeping national treasures within their borders. 252
The UNIDROIT Convention had the potential for balancing the various interests and eradicating some of the legal
issues that have been problematic in the past for claims for the
return of stolen cultural property.253 Unfortunately, the final
draft of the UNIDROIT Convention contains critical provisions
that would disadvantage art importing nations while giving art
source nations the increased power to restrict export and regain possession of cultural property.254 Furthermore, this convention requires art market nations to give "blank check" credit to foreign cultural property export laws. 255 Since the
UNIDROIT Convention favors the retentive policies of art
source countries, it is doubtful that major art importing nations like the United States will ratify it.256 Only a document
that gives comparable weight to the competing interests of art
importing and art source nations will be widely adopted and
successfully utilized. 257
Wide-range acceptance is crucial to the Convention because it will only have an impact if a significant number of
countries become signatories to it.258 The UNIDROIT Convention is applicable in situations where it has been adopted by
both the State requesting the object and the State where the
request is brought.259 Consequently, if major art importing

a rational, sensible trade in art," quoted in [d.
252. [d.
253. Merryman Interview, supra note 232. UNESCO requested UNIDROIT design a new accord to replace the ineffective UNESCO Convention. Hoffman, supra
note 99, at 5.
254. See generally White Paper, supra note 219.
255. Merryman interview, supra note 232.
256. [d. The main contentions that art importing nations have with the
UNIDROIT Convention are found in articles 3.2 and 5. [d. These articles strongly
favor retentionist policies of art source nations and are contrary to the interests of
the United States. [d.
257. See generally Merryman Interview, supra note 232.
258. See generally Hoffman, supra note 99, at 7. One of the downfalls of the
UNESCO Convention was that it was not ratified by enough countries. See supra
note 126.
259. UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 10, at art 10.2. Article 10.2 provides:
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countries refuse to sign this accord, UNIDROIT will be powerless in regulating the traffic of stolen cultural property.260
Only a cooperative effort among nations, based on a scheme
that balances the various interests of art source and art importing countries, can achieve this goal. 261 Unfortunately, the
UNIDROIT Convention fails to create this vital balance. 262
Monique Olivier"

"The provisions of Chapter III shall apply only in respect of a cultural object that
is illegally exported after this Convention enters into force for the requesting State
as well as the State where the request is brought." Id.
260. Merryman Interview, supra note 232.
261. Id.
262. See generally White Paper, supra note 219 .
... Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1997.
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APPENDIX
UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON STOLEN OR
ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL
OBJECTS
(ARTICLES 1 - 11)

CHAPI'ER 1 - SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND DEFINITION
ARTICLE 1

This Convention applies to claims of an international character
for:
(a) the restitution of stolen cultural objects
(b) the return of cultural objects removed from the territory of a Contracting State contrary to its law regulating the
export of cultural objects for the purpose of protecting its cultural heritage (hereinafter "illegally exported cultural objects").
ARTICLE 2

For the purposes of this Convention, cultural objects are
those which, on religious or secular grounds, are of importance
for archaeology, prehistory, literature, art or science and belong to one of the categories listed in the Annex to this Convention.
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CHAPTER II - RESTITUTION OF STOLEN CULTURAL
OBJECTS
ARTICLE 3
(1) For the possessor of a cultural object which has been
stolen shall return it.

(2) For the purposes of this Convention, a cultural object
which has been unlawfully excavated or laWfully excavated but
unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when consistent
with the law of the State where the excavation took place.
(3) Any claim for restitution shall be brought within a
period of three years from the time when the claimant knew
the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years of the
theft.
(4) However, a claim for restitution of a cultural object
forming an integral part of an identified monument or archaeological site, or belonging to a public collection, shall not be
subject to time limitations other than a period of three years
from the time when the claimant knew the location of the
culturai object and the identity of the possessor.
(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, any Contracting State may declare that a claim is subject to a time limitation of 75 years or such longer period as is
provided in its law. A claim made in another Contracting State
for restitution of a cultural object displaced from a monument,
archaeological site or public collection in a Contracting State
making such a declaration shall also be subject to that time
limitation.
(6) A declaration referred to in the preceding paragraph
shall be made at the time of signature, ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession.
(7) For the purposes of this Convention, a "public collection" consists of a group of inventoried or otherwise identified
cultural objects owned by:
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(a) a Contracting State
(b) a regional or local authority of a Contracting State
(c) a religious institution in a Contracting State; or
(d) an institution that is established for an essentially cultural,
educational or scientific purpose in a Contracting State and is
recognized in that State as serving the public interest.
(8) In addition, a claim for restitution of a sacred or communally important cultural object belonging to and used by a
tribal or indigenous community in a Contracting State as part
of that community's traditional or ritual use, shall be subject
to the time limitation applicable to public collections.
ARTICLE 4

(1) The possessor of a stolen cultural object required to
return it shall be entitled, at the time of its restitution, to
payment of fair and reasonable compensation provided that the
possessor neither knew nor ought to have known that the
object was stolen and can prove that it exercised due diligence
when acquiring the object.
(2) Without prejudice to the right of the possessor to compensation referred to in the preceding paragraph, reasonable
efforts shall be made to have the person who transferred the
cultural object to the possessor, or any prior transferor, pay the
compensation where to do so would be consistent with the law
of the State in which the claim is brought.
(3) Payment of compensation to the possessor by the claimant, when this is required, shall be without prejudice to the
right of the claimant to recover it from any other person.
(4) In determining whether the possessor exercised due
diligence, regard shall be had to all the circumstances of the
acquisition, including the character of the parties, the price
paid, whether the possessor consulted any reasonably accessible register of stolen cultural objects, and any other relevant
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information and documentation which it reasonably could have
obtained, and whether the possessor consulted accessible agencies or took any other step that a reasonable person would
have taken in the circumstances.
(5) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable position than the person from whom it acquired the cultural object
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously.

CHAPI'ER III - RETURN OF ILLEGALLY EXPORTED
CULTURAL OBJECTS
ARTICLE 5

(1) A Contracting State may request the court or other
competent authority of another Contracting State to order the
return of a cultural object illegally exported from the territory
of the requesting State.

(2) A cultural object which has been temporarily exported
from the territory of the requesting State, for purposes such as
exhibition, research or restoration, under a permit issued according to its law regulating its export for the purpose of protecting its cultural heritage and not returned in accordance
with the terms of that permit shall be deemed to have been
illegally exported.
(3) The court or other competent authority of the State
addressed shall order the return of an illegally exported cultural object if the requesting State establishes that the removal of
the object from its territory significantly impairs one or more
of the following interests:
(a) the physical preservation of the object or of its context;
(b) the integrity of a complex object;
(c) the preservation of information of, for example, a scientific
or historical character;
(d) the traditional or ritual use of the object by a tribal or indigenous community,
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or establishes that the object is of significant cultural importance for the requesting State.
(4) Any request made under paragraph 1 of this article
shall contain or be accompanied by such information of a factual or legal nature as may assist the court or other competent
authority of the State addressed in determining whether the
requirements of paragraphs 1 to 3 have been met.
(5) Any request for return shall be brought within a period
of three years from the time when the requesting State knew
the location of the cultural object and the identity of its possessor, and in any case within a period of fifty years from the
date of the export or from the date on which the object should
have been returned under a permit referred to in paragraph 2
of this article.
ARTICLE 6

(1) The possessor of a cultural object who acquired the

object after it was illegally exported shall be entitled, at the
time of its return, to payment by the requesting State of fair
and reasonable compensation, provided that the possessor
neither knew nor ought reasonably to have known at the time
of acquisition that the object had been illegally exported.
(2) In determining whether the possessor knew or ought
reasonably to have known that the cultural object had been
illegally exported, regard shall be had to the circumstances of
the acquisition, including the absence of an export certificate
required under the law of the requesting State.
(3) Instead of compensation, and in agreement with the
requesting State, the possessor required to return the cultural
object to that State, may decide:
(a) to retain ownership of the object; or
(b) to transfer ownership against payment or gratuitously to a
person of its choice residing in the requesting State who provides the necessary guarantees.
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(4) The cost of returning the cultural object in accordance
with this article shall be borne by the requesting State, without prejudice to the right of that State to recover costs from
any other person.
(5) The possessor shall not be in a more favourable position that the person from whom it acquired the cultural object
by inheritance or otherwise gratuitously.
ARTICLE 7

(1) The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply where:

(a) the export of a cultural object is no longer illegal at the
time at which the return is requested; or
(b) the object was exported during the lifetime of the person
who created it or within a period of fifty years following the
death of that person.
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of sub-paragraph (b) of
the preceding paragraph, the provisions of this Chapter shall
apply where a cultural object was made by a member or members of a tribal or indigenous community for traditional or
ritual use by that community and the object will be returned to
that community.
CHAPTER IV - GENERAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE

8

(1) A claim under Chapter II and a request under Chapter III may be brought before the courts or other competent
authorities of the Contracting State where the cultural object
is located, in addition to the courts or other competent authorities otherwise having jurisdiction under the rules in force in
Contracting States.
(2) The parties may agree to submit the dispute to any
court or other competent authority or to arbitration.
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(3) Resort may be had to the provisional, including protective, measures available under the law of the Contracting
State where the object is located even when the claim for restitution or request for return of the object is brought before the
courts or other competent authorities of another Contracting
State.
ARTICLE

9

(1) Nothing in this Convention shall prevent a Contracting State from applying any rules more favourable to the restitution or the return of stolen or illegally exported cultural
objects than provided for by this Convention.
(2) This article shall not be interpreted as creating an
obligation to recognise or enforce a decision of a court or other
competent authority of another Contracting State that departs
from the provisions of this Convention.
ARTICLE

10

(1) The provisions of Chapter II shall apply only in respect of a cultural object that is stolen after this Convention
enters into force in respect of the State where the claim is
brought, provided that:
(a) the object was stolen from the territory of a Contracting
State after the entry into force of this Convention for that
State; or
(b) the object is located in a Contracting State after the entry
into force of the Convention for that State.
(2) The provisions of Chapter III shall apply only in respect of a cultural object that is illegally exported after this
Convention enters into force for the requesting State as well as
the State where the request is brought.
(3) This Convention does not in any way legitimise any
illegal transaction of whatever nature which has taken place
before the entry into force of this Convention or which is ex-
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cluded under paragraphs (1) or (2) of this article, nor limit any
right of a State or other person to make a claim under remedies available outside the framework of this Convention for the
restitution or return of a cultural object stolen or illegally
exported before entry into force of this Convention.
CHAPTER V - FINAL PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 11

(1) This Convention is open for signature at the concluding meeting of the Diplomatic Conference for the adoption of
the draft Unidroit Convention on the International Return of
Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects and will remain
open for signature by all States at Rome until 30 June 1996.
(2) This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval by States which have signed it.
(3) This Convention is open for accession by all States
which are not signatory States as from the date it is open for
signature.
(4) Ratification, acceptance, approval· or accession is subject to the deposit of a formal instrument to that effect with
the depositary.
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